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Abstract
The Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in The Wilderness Society v. Kane County
has changed the landscape of litigation arising out of Revised Statute 2477,
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a provision of the Mining Act of 1886 repealed by the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976. Prior to this decision, the presumption was
that the United States owned all federal public lands unless an adverse
claimant proved otherwise. Moreover, any adverse claimant was required to
bring an action under the Quiet Title Act to divest the federal government of
title to its property. The Kane County decision turns both of those
presumptions inside-out, provided that states and counties assert rights
under R.S. 2477, regardless of whether they can be proven. This Article
explores the history of R.S. 2477, its repeal by the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act, and the Tenth Circuit’s historical treatment of R.S. 2477
claims. It also discusses why the Tenth Circuit’s holding in the Kane County
case misconstrues the nature of an R.S. 2477 dispute, overlooks longrecognized presumptions about federal ownership of federal land, and
ignores the myriad of legal issues involved in an R.S. 2477 dispute. Lastly, it
makes specific suggestions about how the Tenth Circuit should address
litigation surrounding the growing number of R.S. 2477 battles in years to
come, to enable litigants and lower courts to more easily navigate this
complex area of law.

I. Introduction
Throughout the country, there is a presumption of land ownership that
is so simple, it need not even be spoken: the federal government owns
federal public land unless an adverse party proves otherwise. Yet, in some
western states, and most recently in southern Utah, counties and local
governments have aggressively attacked this presumption, and claimed title
to federal lands, without having proven any property right in a court of law.
In 2011, the Tenth Circuit sanctioned this practice in The Wilderness Society v.
Kane County, which represents a sea change in the landscape of federal
public lands law.
To put the Kane County dispute in a national perspective, it helps to
juxtapose the parties involved, and replace the land at issue with a beloved,
well-known national treasure. Imagine that the City of New York decided
that it owned rights-of-way across Liberty Island, so it passed an ordinance
“establishing” those rights and posted signs at the base of the Statute of
Liberty, “opening” those rights-of-way to motorcycles and off-road vehicles.
Then imagine mufflerless dirt bikes roaring across manicured lawns in front
of tourists who traveled miles to marvel at one of the most well-known and
carefully preserved national monuments.2 More outrageously, imagine that
the City of New York took down all federal signs directing tourists around
Liberty Island and dumped them into New York Harbor.
2. Statue of Liberty, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior,
http://www.nps.gov/stli/index.htm (noting that “thousands of people visit [Liberty
Island] daily”) (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
4

West

Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012

Then imagine the bewildered National Park Service, flabbergasted by
such hostile, unilateral action, replacing all of its signs and attempting to
speak with the Mayor’s office about the nature of the city’s claims. But
imagine that City of New York refused to meet in person, sent a written
“notice” to the Park Service, threatening to bill the federal government for
the “recovery of costs and expenses” for removing the signs if the National
Park Service did not remove the offending signs immediately.3 This scene is
baffling, and so difficult to picture that it seems almost comical.
Yet, a similar scenario has been unfolding across millions of acres of
federal public lands,4 including several National Parks and National
Monuments, over the past twenty years,5 largely under the national radar.
For decades, environmental groups such as the Southern Utah Wilderness
Alliance (“SUWA”), The Nature Conservancy, The Wilderness Society, the
Sierra Club, and others, have battled to protect the precious natural
resources on and within federal public lands from encroachment by counties
and local governments, which seek to open federal public lands, including
some roads6 and trails, to off-road vehicle users, despite the federal
government’s opposition.7 Despite the common-sense belief that it should
be somewhat difficult, from a procedural and evidentiary standpoint, to
divest the federal government of its property against its expressed will, both
the federal government and the Environmental Groups’ attempts to stop
this loss of federal property often proved unsuccessful.8
The means counties use to divest the federal government of title to its
property is an obscure provision of the Mining Act of 1866 called Revised

3. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1182 (10th Cir.
2011) (Kane County III) (Lucero, J., dissenting) (discussing the facts surrounding the
R.S. 2477 dispute at issue and how it arose).
4. Todd Wilkinson, Roads to Nowhere, NATIONAL PARKS MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1998, at
22 (noting that, as of 1998, an estimated 160,000 miles of R.S. 2477 road claims had
been “staked” in Alaska alone).
5. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 742
(10th Cir. 2005) (SUWA v. BLM); Kurt Repanshek, Secretary Salazar Hopes to Negotiate
R.S. 2477 Solution with Utah Officials, NATIONAL PARKS TRAVELER, Aug. 2, 2010, available at
http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2010/08/secretary-salazar-hopes-negotiate-rs24
77-solution-utah-officials6344 (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
6. Although the term “road” is bandied about frequently in the R.S. 2477
context, many of the “roads” claimed by counties have not been used in many years.
Some might be only two-track trails, accessibly only with an off-road vehicle.
Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 23.
7. See Douglas P. Farr, Protecting Public Lands From the Public: Kane County and
Revised Statute 2477, B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 70-71 (2010) (citing SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at
741).
8. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1171; San Juan County v. United States, 503 F.3d
1163, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2007).
5
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Statute 2477.9 The battle over property rights claimed pursuant to R.S. 2477
has raged for many years, and the Tenth Circuit, despite numerous
opportunities, has consistently failed to establish a framework for
determining the validity of such claims; nor has it issued any guidance to
the various federal agencies that must manage federal lands pursuant to
statutes such as the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”).10
The lands at issue in The Wilderness Society v. Kane County have been
recognized as some of “the most fragile and picturesque public lands in the
United States.”11 In reserving this land as a national monument, President
Clinton described it as a “frontier,” a place where “one can see how nature
shapes human endeavors in the American West, where distance and aridity
have been pitted against our dreams and courage.”12
The assault against these precious natural resources began in 2003,
when Kane County posted signs “opening” R.S. 2477 rights-of-way within the
Monument,13 despite the Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) claim of
title and in direct contradiction of the BLM’s land management plans.14 The
County acted assertively and aggressively in its pursuit of these claimed
rights, and demanded that “BLM take down its signs ‘within a timely period
of sixty days’ and insisted that BLM management ‘instruct’ its employees
not to give the public ‘verbal misinformation’ that the claimed roads were
closed to off-highway vehicle use.”15 Contrary to previous decisions, in
which the Tenth Circuit and other courts have held that counties and local
governmental bodies bear the burden of proving title to contested R.S. 2477
rights-of-way before being able to rely on such property rights in R.S. 2477
litigation, the Kane County decision essentially recognized the county’s title
to several disputed rights-of-way without it ever having to satisfy any burden
of proof before a federal agency or in a court of law.16
In the face of what is certain to be a decades-long battle over federal

9. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932
(R.S. 2477), repealed by Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”),
Pub.L. No. 94-579, § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743.
10. 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006).
11. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 581 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir.
2009) (Kane County II), rev’d, 632 F.3d at 1171.
12. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50, 223-24 (Sept. 18, 1996).
13. R.S. 2477, repealed by FLPMA, § 706(a).
14. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir.
2011) (Kane County III).
15. Id. at 118-82 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (noting that, in the County’s initial
letter to BLM, it “declared in no uncertain terms that BLM road signs violated ‘county
policy’ and constituted an ‘intrusion against the rights of the dominant estate.’”).
16. Id. at 1174 (vacating district court’s decision and remanding case with
instructions to dismiss based on The Wilderness Society’s lack of prudential standing
to challenge Kane County’s actions within the Monument).
6
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control and management authority, the Tenth Circuit needs to recognize the
gaping holes in its R.S. 2477 jurisprudence and begin to fill them with a
framework that lower courts and litigants alike can act upon. Such a
framework would also help the federal agencies, primarily the National Park
Service and the Bureau of Land Management, determine how to treat
claimed R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in their planning processes. This Article will
address the need for such a framework and suggest possible jurisprudential
“guideposts.” Part II will discuss the primary statutes governing R.S. 2477
disputes, placing the ancient text of R.S. 2477 in the modern context of
federal land management. Part III will explore the Tenth Circuit’s historical
treatment of key R.S. 2477 disputes, which established the beginnings of a
framework that the court later ignored in Kane County. Part IV will analyze
the Kane County litigation in depth, focusing on the Tenth Circuit’s en banc
opinion issued in January 2011, and discuss how the majority’s opinion sets
a dangerous precedent for future R.S. 2477 litigation. Part V will highlight
three areas where the Tenth Circuit has declined to provide a framework that
will allow federal courts to analyze and adjudicate R.S. 2477 claims more
efficiently and consistently and Part V will conclude with some suggestions
as to how to make that happen.

II. The Statutory Foundation: Revised Statute 2477 and the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act
A. Revised Statute 2477
The origin of this modern land-grab is a provision of Section 8 of “[a]n
Act granting the Right of Way to Ditch and Canal Owners over the Public
Lands, and for other Purposes,” commonly referred to as the Mining Act of
1866.17 As the Tenth Circuit has noted, the language of Revised Statute
2477, or R.S. 2477, as it is now known, is “short, sweet, and enigmatic.”18 It
states simply that: “the right of way for the construction of highways over
public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.”19 As part of a
series of legislative acts aimed at disposing of vast amounts of federal lands
during an era in which the federal government legislated extensively to
encourage settlement and development of public lands in the western
United States,20 the burden on any party seeking a right-of-way was minimal.
There was no requirement to submit any proof of ownership or application,

17. R.S. 2477, repealed by FLPMA, § 706(a).
18. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 761
(10th Cir. 2005) (SUWA v. BLM).
19. Id.
20. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1165 (quoting SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 741);
see Matthew L. Squires, Federal Regulation of R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 547, 558 (2008).
7
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and the grantee received no documentation from the federal government.
Early regulations interpreting R.S. 2477 stated: “[t]his grant becomes
effective upon the construction or establishing of highways, in accordance
with the State laws, over public lands not reserved for public uses. No
application should be filed under this act, as no action on the part of the
Federal Government is necessary.”21 However, the party seeking to establish
title to a right of way pursuant to R.S. 2477 has always been required to
demonstrate “acts . . . sufficient to manifest an intent to accept the
congressional offer.”22 Such acts generally included grading or maintaining a
road or right-of-way and its use by the public.23
Also, the statute requires that any R.S. 2477 claimant show that the
road or right-of-way was located on lands “not reserved for public uses.”24
“Reserved” lands are those that “have been expressly withdrawn from the
public domain by statute, executive order, or treaty and dedicated as a park,
military post, or Native American land or for some other specific federal
use.”25 Lands falling within this definition were those subject to sale or
disposal to individuals under general land laws. Thus, once a parcel of
federal land was set aside as a national forest, national park, military
reservation or for a similar use, any right-of-way contained therein would be
considered reserved for public uses and no R.S. 2477 right could
subsequently vest.26 For the next 110 years, R.S. 2477 allowed states,
counties, and municipalities to establish many of the roads crisscrossing the
western United States.27

B. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
As the federal government’s interest in its property shifted from
disposition to retention, and preservation, Congress enacted a series of
statutes in the 1970s reflecting this changed approach, including the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”);28 the National Forest
Management Act;29 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.30
21. Regulations Governing Rights-of-Way for Canals, Ditches, Reservoirs,
Water Pipe Lines, Telephone and Telegraph Lines, Tramroads, Roads and Highways,
Oil and Gas Pipe Lines, Etc., 56 Interior Dec. 533, 551 (1938).
22. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1165.
23. Id.
24. R.S. 2477, repealed by FLPMA, § 706(a).
25. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 784
(10th Cir. 2005) (SUWA v. BLM).
26. Humboldt County v. United States, 684 F.2d 1276, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 740.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (2006).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (2006).
30. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784.
8
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These statutes represented a 180-degree shift in the federal government’s
approach to managing public lands.31 Instead of allowing and encouraging
citizens to settle upon federal land and divest the federal government of its
property for their own private use, these statutes required federal land
management agencies to retain lands for the general public’s use.32 FLPMA,
in particular, required federal agencies to begin managing federal public
lands using a conservation-based approach called “sustained yield,” which
contemplated planning around environmental values and objectives.33
FLPMA expressly repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976, but only as to
unestablished rights-of-way.34 The statute provided that any “valid” R.S.
2477 rights-of-way “existing on the date of approval of [FLPMA]” would
continue in effect.35 Thus, FLPMA essentially “froze” R.S. 2477 rights as they
were in 1976.36 After that date, neither states, local governments, nor private
citizens could divest the federal government of its property using R.S. 2477.
Despite this seemingly bright-line cutoff point, in the years following
Congress’ passage of FLPMA, it was anything but clear which rights-of-way
were “valid,” much less “existing.”37 Neither the federal government nor the
states tracked the historical use of roads, trails, or routes. To this day, a
determination of whether an R.S. 2477 right-of-way existed prior to 1976
requires a road-by-road analysis of historical land records and surveys,
maps, federal mining and grazing surveys, and affidavits attesting to the
route’s use, if any of these documents even exist.38 There are still no
comprehensive surveys or maps indicating where unrecorded R.S. 2477
routes cross federal lands, only piecemeal surveys and lists that are difficult
to access or verify.39
Despite decades of litigation over R.S. 2477 roads, Congress has not
spoken to the issue by amending FLPMA and providing a statutory
framework to help courts resolve the discrepancies between the statutes;
nor has it delegated authority to federal management agencies to

31. Farr, supra note 7, at 70 (citing SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 741).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784.
33. Scott W. Hardt, Federal Land Management in the Twenty-First Century: From Wise
Use to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 345, 377 (1994).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (grandfathering valid rights-of-way).
35. Id.
36. SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 741 (citing Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068,
1081 (10th Cir. 1988)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 741; Kane County v. United States, 2011 WL 2489189, at *8 (D. Utah,
June 21, 2011) (Kane County I), rev’d, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011).
39. See e.g.Utah AGRC R.S. 2477 Rural Roads Mapping Project, UTAH GIS PORTAL
(Dec. 01, 2008), http://gis.utah.gov/agrc-rs2477-rural-roads-mapping-project/rs2477rural-roads-mapping-project (allowing users to view recorded R.S. 2477 roads only).
9
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promulgate regulations guiding their administration of R.S. 2477 claims.40 In
fact, Congress has actually prohibited the BLM from adopting regulations
establishing a framework for agency adjudication of R.S. 2477 claims.41
There is also no legislative history of R.S. 2477 that might provide informal
guidance to litigants.42
In essence, therefore, lower courts, agencies, and interested parties
have only the relevant statutes and case law to guide their actions. To the
extent the statutes have left gaps, the cases have either failed to fill them, or
filled them in contradictory ways, as will be discussed in Sections III and IV
below.

III. Revised Statute 2477 Jurisprudence in the Tenth Circuit
Prior to The Wilderness Society v. Kane County
A. Sierra Club v. Hodel
Since 1976, federal courts within the Tenth Circuit have struggled with
the issue of how to analyze R.S. 2477 disputes, creating confusion for
litigants and difficulty for federal and state land management processes.43
One of the first significant R.S. 2477 cases to reach the Tenth Circuit was
Sierra Club v. Hodel, in which several environmental organizations sued
Secretary of the Interior Donald P. Hodel, the Bureau of Land Management,
and Garfield County over Garfield County’s proposal to widen portions of
the Burr Trail, a recognized R.S. 2477 road connecting the town of Boulder,
Utah, with one of the marinas at Lake Powell.44 The proposal was to widen
approximately twenty-eight miles of the Burr Trail from a one-lane dirt road
into a two-lane gravel road, all portions of which lay within or adjacent to
two federally protected Wilderness Study Areas: Steep Creek and North
Escalante Canyon.45 Concerned that widening the road and increasing the
traffic capacity would adversely impact sensitive flora, fauna, and
archaeological sites, the environmental groups’ complaint alleged that BLM
had failed to take adequate steps to protect these areas pursuant to FLPMA

40. Kane County v. Kempthorne, 495 F. Supp.2d 1143, 1155 (D. Utah 2007).
41. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior and Related Agencies’ Appropriations Act, § 108
(1997), enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (stating that “No final rule or regulation of any agency
of the Federal Government pertaining to the recognition, management, or validity of
a right-of-way pursuant to Revised Statute 2477 . . . shall take effect unless expressly
authorized by an Act of Congress. . . .”).
42. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1080 (10th Cir. 1988), rev’d, 956 F.2d
970 (10th Cir. 1992).
43. Farr, supra note 7, at 70.
44. 848 F.2d at 1073.
45. Id.
10
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and NEPA.46
After a trial, the district court ruled in favor of the County and BLM,
allowing the construction, but requiring the County to get a permit from
BLM under FLPMA to relocate part of the road where it passed almost
directly through one of the Wilderness Study Areas.47 The district court
declined to take up the issue of determining the width of the R.S. 2477 rightof-way in the Burr Trail, noting that existing Tenth Circuit precedent required
the BLM to make that determination.48 The court also ordered the agency
“to conduct studies of plant life along the trail, to monitor the construction
in areas with archaeological sites, and to direct alterations in the plan where
necessary to preserve plant life or archaeological sites.”49 The environmental
groups then appealed.50
The Tenth Circuit took up the issue of whether the County’s plans were
included in the scope of the original right-of-way for the Burr Trail and
whether, among other issues, the proposed widening would affect either of
the Wilderness Study Areas.51 The former reflects one of the first times the
court had to consider the merits of the County’s claim to the R.S. 2477 rightof-way in the context of a federal land management agency planning
process: if in fact Garfield County possessed an R.S. 2477 right-of-way in the
Burr Trail, which no party contested, the court was faced with the issue of
whether and to what extent to allow the County to improve the right-of-way
to allow more vehicle traffic. The latter issue, whether the proposed
construction would negatively affect the Wilderness Study Areas, went
beyond the mere existence and scope of the property right and implicated
FLPMA because of the Burr Trail’s proximity to the Wilderness Study Areas.52
Thus, the court properly analyzed the issues within the context of a federal
land management scheme, not as a boundary dispute between the BLM and
the County.
Under FLPMA, the court recognized that the BLM has a duty to
manage Wilderness Study Areas much as it would manage Wilderness Areas
“so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness . . . [and] by regulation or otherwise [to] take any action required
to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation.”53 The court also recognized
the County’s uncontested R.S. 2477 right-of-way in the Burr Trail.54 Upon
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1073-74.
Id. at 1074.
Id. at 1084.
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1075, 1085.
Id. at 1080.
11
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recognizing the potential conflict between these two statutes, which is
guaranteed to continue occurring throughout the states in the Tenth Circuit,
and beyond, the Tenth Circuit had a golden opportunity to establish a
framework for resolving these issues and clarify which party bears the
burden of proof on each issue; however, it did not. Instead, to answer the
question of whether the County had a vested right to expand the scope of its
right-of-way, the court examined the original text of R.S. 2477, determining
that any right the County held to expand the Burr Trail would be determined
by R.S. 2477 alone.55 The court then analyzed the text of R.S. 2477, found
that the width of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is properly measured under state
law, and ultimately declined to opine as to the exact scope of Garfield
County’s right-of-way in the Burr Trail.56
When it finally addressed whether allowing the project would violate
FLPMA, the court found a “latent” ambiguity in the statute because FLPMA’s
nondegradation provisions inherently conflicted with the Savings Provision
in 43 U.S.C. sections 1701(a) and (h) (restricting the BLM from managing
federal lands in a way that impacts vested rights).57 The court then afforded
deference to the agency’s interpretation of the interplay between these two
sections pursuant to one of its previous decisions, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas
Association v. Watt,58 rather than attempting to resolve the inherent conflict
itself through the canons of statutory interpretation.59
The BLM’s
interpretation was that FLPMA exempts “valid existing rights” from the
nonimpairment and nondegradation standards.60
Thus, even though
Garfield County had applied for a permit, pursuant to FLPMA, to move
certain sections of the road adjacent to the Wilderness Study Areas further
away from their boundaries, the court held that the County had a right to
build the road in its original proposed location (adjacent to the Wilderness
Study Areas).61 The court then remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether, in fact, the proposed construction would degrade or
impair the Wilderness Study Areas under FLPMA, with little to no instruction
on how to arrive at such a determination.62

55. Id. at 1079-80.
56. Id. at 1084.
57. Id. at 1085.
58. 696 F.2d 734, 749 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965)).
59. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1078 (10th Cir. 1988).
60. Id. at 1088.
61. Id.
62. Id. The court also examined whether the proposed road construction met
NEPA’s “major federal action” threshold, held that it did, and remanded the NEPA
issue to the district court, with instructions for the district court to remand that issue
to the agency. Id. at 1096.
12
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On the FLPMA issue, at least, the case went full circle, from agency to
district court to appellate court and back to district court, leaving more
questions unanswered than resolved. On remand the BLM conducted the
required Environmental Assessment pursuant to NEPA, as required by the
Tenth Circuit, and issued a Finding of No Significant Impact, allowing the
project to proceed.63 The Sierra Club appealed that decision to the Interior
Board of Land Appeals and later to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed, in part
based on the “law of the case” doctrine and its earlier holding that BLM
could not “prevent improvements to Garfield County’s R.S. 2477 right-of-way
[citation omitted] provided the improvements are ‘reasonable and necessary
to ensure safe travel.’”64 In short, however, the Tenth Circuit’s Hodel decision
represented the court’s first opportunity to take up the issue of how R.S.
2477 and FLPMA should be interpreted; an opportunity the court declined to
accept.

B. SUWA v. BLM
As tensions grew between federal land managers and local
governments over the federal government’s management of public lands in
southern Utah, county and state officials became more aggressive in their
assertion of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. In September 1996, President Clinton
(perhaps unwittingly) exacerbated the tensions by establishing the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument, pursuant to his authority under
the American Antiquities Act,65 reserving almost two million acres of land
and placing them under BLM management.66 Sixty-eight percent of the
Monument’s acreage lies in Kane County, and thirty-two percent lies within
Garfield County.67 Since the establishment of the Monument, Kane County,
in particular, has engaged in a decades-long campaign to undermine the
federal government’s management of the Monument’s aesthetic,
environmental, and archaeological resources.68 In the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument alone, there have been at least three legal
actions wherein Kane County claimed R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in the past ten

63. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362, 366 (10th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 369 (quoting Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1090)).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006).
66. Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Bush, 316 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1184 (10th Cir. 2004).
67. Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Consolidate, ¶ 5 (filed Feb. 8, 2006) in Kane
County I, 2011 WL 2489189.
68. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 742
(10th Cir. 2005) (SUWA v. BLM); Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Bush, 455 F.3d 1094, 109798 (10th Cir. 2006).
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years.69
In 2005, the Tenth Circuit issued another landmark decision arising out
of the dispute over federal ownership and management of lands within the
Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument: SUWA v. BLM.70 At that
point, R.S. 2477 had become “one of the more contentious land use issues
in the West,” according to Tenth Circuit Judge Michael McConnell, who
authored the majority opinion.71 From the outset, the court recognized the
difficulty of resolving the scope of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way claim, given that
there was no administrative component to establishing a claim and no
requirement to record the claim once it had been established.72 Moreover,
the court recognized the lack of legislative history, statutory text clarifying
the procedures Congress intended, agency regulations, or informal
commentary guiding courts and litigants alike.73 Thus, the issue of how to
determine the existence of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way, the scope of any
existing right-of-way, and to what extent FLPMA and other modern statutes
require federal agencies to plan around such rights-of-way by 2005 had
become a jurisprudential “flash point.”74
Shortly after the Monument was designated, road crews from three of
the southernmost counties in Utah — Kane, Garfield, and San Juan —
entered the Monument and began grading several dirt trails.75 The counties
did not notify BLM in advance of their plans or attempt to gain BLM’s
permission to enter and begin road construction activities in the
Monument.76 According to the court, “six of the routes lie within wilderness
study areas,” “nine are within the [Monument],” and “six others traverse a
mesa overlooking the entrance corridor to the Needles District of
Canyonlands National Park.”77
SUWA filed informal protests with the BLM about the County’s
activities, but the BLM did nothing to stop them.78 SUWA then filed an
action in federal court against the BLM and the counties, “alleging that the
Counties had engaged in unlawful road construction activities and that the

69. SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 742; Kane Cnty. v. Kempthorne, 495 F. Supp. 2d
1143, 1147 (D. Utah 2007); The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162,
1165 (10th Cir. 2011) (Kane County III).
70. 425 F.3d at 742.
71. Id. at 740.
72. Id. at 741 (acknowledging the lack of any requirement of entry, application,
license, patent or deed under R.S. 2477).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 742.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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BLM had violated its duties” under FLPMA, the American Antiquities Act,
and the National Environmental Policy Act, by failing to act.79 The district
court referred the issue of whether the counties possessed R.S. 2477 rightsof-way in the sixteen claimed routes back to the BLM and stayed the
pending federal action until the agency could make the determination.80 The
BLM conducted a thorough, informal adjudication of the claimed routes and
found that the counties lacked any rights in fifteen of the sixteen claimed
routes, and found that Kane County had exceeded the scope of any right-ofway it held in the remaining route, the Skutumpah Road.81 The district court
then treated further briefs in the federal action as appeals of the agency
adjudication and affirmed all of the BLM’s determinations.82
The counties appealed, arguing that the district court’s decision to
affirm the administrative findings regarding the counties’ lack of any rightsof-way in the sixteen claimed R.S. 2477 routes was in error, and that the
corresponding declaratory judgment that the counties had trespassed on
federal land was similarly erroneous.83 The Tenth Circuit addressed these
issues in reverse order; first, it analyzed the trespass claims and then the
issue of whether the counties, in fact, had R.S. 2477 rights in any of the
sixteen claimed routes.84 With respect to the claims of trespass against the
counties, the court began by analyzing the BLM regulations governing the
issue of a party claiming a right-of-way across federal public lands.85 The
trespass regulations, in particular, provided that any use claimed by such a
party “that is beyond the scope and specific limitations of such an
authorization or that causes unnecessary or undue degradation is prohibited
and shall constitute a trespass.”86
Analyzing this regulation, the district court held that, as long as the
counties stay within their rights-of-way, they did not require BLM’s
authorization to conduct routine maintenance on roads within the
Monument.87 Rejecting that approach, the Tenth Circuit held that “the
holder of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way across federal land must consult with the
appropriate federal land management agency before it undertakes any
improvements to an R.S. 2477 right of way beyond routine maintenance.”88
For undisputed R.S. 2477 routes, it was clear after SUWA v. BLM that

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1732; 16 U.S.C. § 431; 42 U.S.C. § 4321).
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 744.
Id. at 744-45.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 2801.3(a) (2004) (deleted April 22, 2005)).
Id. at 745 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 2801.3(a)).
Id.
Id.
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counties could not drive bulldozers and road graders onto BLM land to
conduct “routine maintenance” of these routes without BLM authorization.
As the court noted:
Unless it knows in advance when right-of-way holders propose to
change the width, alignment, configuration, surfacing, or type of
roads across federal land, the BLM cannot effectively discharge
its responsibilities to determine whether the proposed changes
are reasonable and necessary, whether they would impair or
degrade the surrounding lands, and whether modifications in the
plans should be proposed.89
At this point, it would seem that all the Tenth Circuit needed to do was
remand the action to the district court, with instructions to remand it to the
agency to determine whether to authorize the counties’ construction
activities along the lines of the framework the Tenth Circuit established in
its decision.90 This framework involved two steps: (1) notice by the R.S. 2477
claimant to the federal agency charged with managing the relevant public
lands over which the R.S. 2477 right-of-way crosses of the proposed road
improvements or construction activities; and (2) an agency determination of
“whether the proposed improvement is reasonable and necessary in light of
the traditional uses of the rights-of-way as of October 21, 1976,” any
potential effects of the activities, and where required, agency “alternatives
that serve to protect the lands.”91 The problem with this framework,
however, is that it only applied to nonroutine maintenance and construction
activities. If the counties unilaterally determined that their proposed
activities were “routine maintenance,” within the scope of the R.S. 2477
grant as of 1976, there would be no need to notify the appropriate federal
land management agency, much less seek its approval.92 If the activities
constituted “construction,” on the other hand, which included acts such as
“grading or blading a road for the first time,” realigning the road, or
improving the surface, agency notice was required.93 In short, the court
noted, “‘[b]ulldoze first, talk later’ is not a recipe for constructive
intergovernmental relations or intelligent land management.”94
With respect to the district court’s decision to remand the initial
determination of the validity of the R.S. 2477 rights-of-way to the BLM, the
Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that BLM did not have primary jurisdiction
over R.S. 2477 claims; thus finding that the district court’s referral was an

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 749.
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abuse of discretion.95 After examining the text of the statute and reviewing
the agency’s historical interpretation of it, the court determined that nothing
in this history gave the BLM primary jurisdiction to determine the validity of
an R.S. 2477 claim.96 It seemed, however, that the court was implicitly
acknowledging BLM’s authority to make some type of determination of a
route’s validity, stating that “nothing in our decision today impugns the
BLM’s authority to make nonbinding, administrative determinations, or the
introduction and use of BLM findings as evidence in litigation.”97
Moreover, and to add further confusion, the Tenth Circuit held that
nothing in its SUWA v. BLM decision precluded the agency from making an
initial determination of the validity of an R.S. 2477 right-of-way “for its own
land-use planning purposes.”98 This really goes to the heart of the matter in
an R.S. 2477 dispute. The federal agencies are charged with managing the
federal public lands for a multitude of uses, and must engage in periodic
planning processes pursuant to their statutory mandates, as well as address
concrete issues that arise when conflicts flare between competing uses.
After SUWA v. BLM, the agencies were limited to making “administrative
determinations” of the validity of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, for the purposes of
planning only.99 Yet, the agencies have no primary jurisdiction to make a
determination as to the validity, which would carry the force of law.100 The
message, then, was that a county simply had to “check in” with an agency
about any potential road improvement or road construction, but the
agency’s opinion on whether those activities could proceed or not could be
taken with a proverbial grain of salt.
To attempt to guide the district court on remand, the Tenth Circuit
discussed the burdens of proof in an R.S. 2477 dispute, which was somewhat
instructive.101 First, the court stated that “the party seeking to enforce rightsof-way against the federal government bears the burden of proof.”102 The
court explained that “this allocation of the burden of proof to the R.S. 2477
is consonant with federal law and federal interests.”103 It is also consistent
with “the established rule that land grants are construed favorably to the
Government” and the principle that, “if there are doubts they are resolved for
the Government, not against it.”104 Thus, after 2005, the rule in the Tenth

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 757-58.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id.
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Circuit was that a party seeking to assert an R.S. 2477 claim to a disputed
route was required first to prove that it held valid title to that right of way in
a court of law.105
Second, the court established the “public use standard” for
determining when and if an R.S. 2477 right-of-way had vested.106 The public
use standard had two components: “the landowner’s objectively manifested
intent to dedicate property to the public use as a right of way, and
acceptance by the public.”107 The easier of the two requirements to
determine is dedication, which the court held could manifest “by express
statement or [be] presumed from conduct, usually by allowing the public
‘the uninterrupted use and enjoyment of their privilege’ over a specified
period of time.”108 The latter component, acceptance, has been the most
difficult to determine,109 but the court held that under Utah common law,
acceptance is manifested by “continuous public use for a period of ten
years.”110 In different states, the common law might dictate a different result.
In short, although the SUWA v. BLM decision was lengthy, it gave little
guidance to lower courts and litigants alike. The Tenth Circuit established
some useful definitions (of “reserved” lands, what constitutes a “highway,”
and how “construction” and “public use” are measured)111 and reiterated the
burden of proof. It left most major issues unaddressed, however, such as a
framework within which litigants or lower courts could assess R.S. 2477
disputes, combining the mandates of FLPMA with the text of R.S. 2477.112 It
established primary jurisdiction to determine R.S. 2477 rights in the district
court, but gave the courts little guidance on how they should determine
those rights.

C. Utah v. United States
In a 2008 decision, the United States District Court for the District of

105. Id. at 755, 757, 757 n. 12, 758, 769; Kane County v. Kempthorne, 495 F.
Supp.2d 1143, 1151, 1155 (D. Utah 2007); The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah,
560 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151 (D. Utah 2008) (Kane County I).
106. SUWA v. BLM, 435 F.3d at 769-70.
107. Id. at 769 (citing ISAAC GRANT THOMPSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
HIGHWAYS 48-52 (1868) (dedication); id. at 54-57 (acceptance); JOSEPH K. ANGELL &
THOMAS DURFEE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HIGHWAYS 146-65 (2d ed. 1868) (dedication);
id. at 174-83 (acceptance); RICHARD POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY VOL. 6 § 84.01
(2005) (hereinafter Powell); see The President, Recorder and Trustees of Cincinnati v.
White’s Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431, 438-40, 8 L.Ed. 452 (1832)).
108. SUWA v. BLM, 435 F.3d at 769.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 771.
111. Id. at 776, 782, 784.
112. Id. at 788.
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Utah considered an action brought by the State of Utah and Juab County,
wherein the plaintiffs sought to quiet title to several claimed R.S. 2477 roads
on BLM lands in western Utah.113 Several environmental groups sought to
intervene as defendants, including the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,
The Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club, to protect their members’
interest in management of certain public lands, “managed by law to protect
their roadless, wild nature, and all of which traverse or abut lands proposed
for wilderness protection.”114 As stated in their briefing in support of the
motion to intervene, the environmental groups sought to protect their
members’ interest in the federal government’s management of the disputed
area because “[t]he goal of the State’s case is clear: to open routes to motor
vehicles that have been partially closed as a result of the establishment of
the Deep Creek Mountains and Scott’s Basin wilderness study areas
(Wilderness Study Areas) and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land use
planning decisions.”115 Thus, they argued, “[i]f the State prevails, the
resumption of motor vehicle use on these routes is likely and would cause
substantial ecological damage. … In order to protect [their] long-standing
and oft-recognized interests in wildlands protection, [the intervenors] seek]
the right to intervene on behalf of Federal Defendants.”116
In its analysis of the environmental groups’ arguments supporting
intervention, the court considered both the subject of the property interest
(an R.S. 2477 route) and the potential impact of the decision on that
property interest (management for wilderness protection by the federal
government or management for off-road vehicle use by the State and
County).117 Considering the entire legal landscape, which includes the
various environmental statutes requiring the BLM to manage the federal
government’s property for particular uses and with a view toward
conservation, the court aptly stated that “the issue is not just who holds title
to the easement; it is also the scope of the easement. A ruling on the merits
favoring plaintiffs may result in opening closed portions of the rights-of-way
to vehicle travel, would change the land management ability of the federal
agency as to those routes, and may reduce the chance that the federal land
would retain its wilderness characteristics.”118 Finding that SUWA also
proved its interest would not be adequately represented by the BLM, the

113. Utah v. United States, 2008 WL 4170017, at *1 (D. Utah, Sept. 3, 2008)
(unreported).
114. Id. (quoting SUWA’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Intervene, at 1).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *4.
118. Id. (citing Decl. of Suzanne Jones ¶ 15 (attached as Ex. 2 to SUWA’s Mem.
Supp.)).
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court granted the organization’s motion to intervene.119 This decision,
although limited in scope to the motion to intervene, at least recognized
that R.S. 2477 decisions must take the entire statutory landscape into
consideration because they implicate issues and rights beyond mere
ownership of property.

IV. The Kane County Litigation
The Kane County litigation involves four major reserved parcels of
federal lands within the boundaries of Kane County: the Grand StaircaseEscalante National Monument, the Paria-Vermillion Cliffs Wilderness,
Moquith Mountain Wilderness Study Area, and Glen Canyon National
Recreation Area.120 All of these are federal reserves managed by either the
BLM or the National Park Service, pursuant to various statutes and federal
regulations, and they total approximately 1.6 million acres.121 Kane County
now claims title to R.S. 2477 routes in each of these four areas, and, as will
be discussed below, aggressively and openly flouted the federal
government’s authority over them, engaging in a systemic replacement of
federal management signs with Kane County signs, purporting to “open” all
R.S. 2477 routes to vehicle traffic.122

A. The Management Framework: FLPMA, the Wilderness
Act, the National Park Service Organic Act, Agency
Regulations, and Management Plans
First, the BLM manages the Monument pursuant to FLPMA123 and its
November 1999 Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument
Management Plan [hereinafter “Monument Plan”], which became effective in
February 2000.124 Understanding the agency’s management philosophy with
respect to road closures in the Monument requires both the text of the
Monument Plan and a map, known as “Map 2.”125 Map 2 denotes all roads
that are open to vehicle traffic within the Monument and provides that all
roads not marked on Map 2 are closed, “subject to valid existing rights.”126

119. Id. at *5.
120. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 560 F. Supp.2d 1147, 1153 (D.
Utah 2008) (Kane County I).
121. Id.; The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 581 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th
Cir. 2009) (Kane County II), rev’d, 632 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2011).
122. Id.
123. 43 U.S.C. § 1732.
124. See 65 Fed.Reg. 10819-10821 (Feb. 29, 2000); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a)
(“The Secretary [of Interior] shall manage the public lands ... in accordance with the
land use plans developed by him under section 1712 of this title[.]”).
125. Kane County II, 581 F.3d at 1223.
126. Id.
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More specifically, the Monument Plan states that “[s]ome government
entities may have a valid existing right to an access route under Revised
Statutes (R.S.) 2477.”127 While the Plan acknowledges that all of the R.S.
2477 claims were not necessarily known by the agency at the time it
implemented the Plan, it states that if any claims were subsequently made,
“the validity of those claims would have to be determined.”128 If the claims were
determined to be valid, the Monument Plan states that it would “respect
those as valid existing rights.”129 If not, the Plan provides that “the
transportation system described in the Approved Plan will be the one administered in the
Monument.”130
The BLM also manages the Paria-Vermillion Cliffs Wilderness, which
Congress reserved as a wilderness area in 1984,131 and Moquith Mountain
Wilderness Study Area pursuant to the Wilderness Act and FLPMA section
603(a).132 Section 603(a) requires the agency to manage all Wilderness Study
Areas “so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for preservation as
wilderness” and to, “by regulation or otherwise[,] take any action required to
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their resources
or to afford environmental protection.”133 Finally, the National Park Service
manages the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area pursuant to a
delegation of authority from Congress in the National Park Service Organic
Act.134 As the district court noted, each of these areas is either “totally
closed to off-highway vehicle use or is only open to such use in limited
areas” designated by the BLM or the NPS.135

B. Factual Background: Tensions Over Federal Control of
Public Lands in Kane County.
In March of 2003, Kane County officials sent a letter to the Monument
Manager warning that the County intended to assert its ownership of
claimed rights-of-way pursuant to R.S. 2477.136 In the letter, Kane County
Commissioners stated that
The monument road number signs are a clear manifestation and
127. Id. (quoting Monument Plan, p. 46 n.1).
128. Id. (quoting Monument Plan, p. 46, n.1) (emphasis in original).
129. Id. (quoting Monument Plan, p. 46, n.1).
130. Id. (quoting Monument Plan, p. 46, n.1) (emphasis in original).
131. Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-406, 98 Stat. 1485 (Aug. 28,
1984).
132. 43 U.S.C. § 1782; see 45 Fed.Reg. 75602-75603 (Nov. 14, 1980) (final
wilderness inventory decision designating the Moquith Mountain WSA).
133. 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460Dd-Dd-9.
135. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 560 F. Supp.2d 1147, 1153 (D.
Utah 2008) (Kane County I).
136. Id. at 1154.
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implementation of the restrictions ostensibly implemented with
the approval of the monument plan on November 15, 1999. The
federal numbering system, therefore, conveys the impression of
federal ownership and control of county asserted roads and
closes travel on roads not numbered by the BLM. The federal
road numbers also conflict with the current county road
numbering system that has been in place for several years. The
ATV/motorcycle restrictive signs are inconsistent with county
policy regarding vehicle travel on county roads and conveys a
legal ability of the BLM to place restrictions on those roads.137
Later that summer, Kane County employees removed thirty-one BLM
road closure signs from within the Monument and deposited them at the
BLM’s Monument Manager’s office in Kanab, along with a “Notice”
demanding that BLM remove signs restricting travel on “Kane County roads”
within the Monument.138 The County’s Notice asserted that the BLM signs
were “obstructing public access upon county roads in violation of state law”
and that the BLM’s road closures failed “to respect the rights of the
dominant estate regarding rights-of-way granted to the State of Utah and to
Kane County under Revised Statute 2477.”139
In 2005, Kane County posted 268 signs on hundreds of closed routes,
“including 103 inside the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument.”140
Sixty-three of these signs “open[ed] routes to off-highway vehicle travel
otherwise restricted by the federal land management plan,” using decals
indicating to off-highway vehicle (“OHV”) users that the routes were open for
such use.141 Later, the County removed all but thirty-nine of the signs.142
Concurrently, Kane County adopted an ordinance, opening all roads
within County borders to OHV use, including roads on federal land.143 The
Ordinance declared that Kane County “claims the right and ownership of all
Class B and Class D roads” within the “County Road System.”144 Under state
law Class B roads are “public highways”145 suitable for two-wheel drive
vehicles and Class D roads are “any road, way, or other land surface route
that has been or is established by use or constructed” and maintained for

137. Id. at 1154-55 (citing March 10, 2003 Letter from Kane County
Commissioners to BLM’s Manager of the Monument at 1-2).
138. Id. at 1155.
139. Id.
140. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1182 (10th Cir.
2011) (Kane County III) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
141. Id.; Kane County I, 560 F. Supp.2d at 1156.
142. Id.
143. Kane County Ordinance No. 2005-03 (Aug. 22, 2005).
144. Id.
145. Utah Code § 72-3-103 (1953).
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four-wheeled vehicles.”146 Furthermore, it declared that all of the Class B
and Class D roads are “open, unless designated [as] closed to off-highway
vehicle (OHV) use.”147
The Ordinance also provided that currently registered OHVs could be
operated on the County Road System as posted by sign or designated by
map or description as open to off-highway vehicle use by the County.148 The
Ordinance defines “OHVs” as motorcycles, snowmobiles, and all-terrain
vehicles (“ATVs”).149 Kane County Commissioner Habbeshaw testified that
the Ordinance “opened all Kane County Transportation System Roads to
ATV travel,” and that those routes opened to OHV use included “[a]ll Class B
and Class D roads.”150 Many of these “Kane County Transportation System
Roads” were on lands managed by the federal government.

C. The District Court’s Decision: Kane County I
The Wilderness Society and the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
(the Environmental Groups) filed a complaint in federal court in response to
the County’s actions, asserting that Kane County had violated the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and its actions,
including the Ordinance discussed above, and the sign removal and
replacement campaign, were preempted by federal law.151
The
Environmental Groups sought a declaration that the County’s actions were
unconstitutional and sought an injunction preventing the County from
engaging in further similar conduct, until the County had proven that it held
any property rights in the alleged rights-of-way.152 The County filed a motion
to dismiss the Environmental Groups’ complaint, claiming that its actions
were proper because it held fee simple title to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in the
disputed routes.153
From the outset, the County defended the
Environmental Groups’ complaint as if it asserted a claim under the Quiet
Title Act, which it did not.154 Despite the County’s attempts to manipulate
the litigation into a property dispute under the Quiet Title Act, the district
court remained steadfast in its analysis of the Environmental Groups’ claims
under the Supremacy Clause.155

146. Id. § 72-3-105(1).
147. Kane County Ordinance No. 2005-03 (Aug. 22, 2005).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 632 F.3d 1162, 1182 (10th Cir.
2011) (Kane County III) (citing Appendix 1715-16).
151. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 560 F. Supp.2d 1147, 1149 (D.
Utah 2008) (Kane County I).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1150.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1150-51.
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Before analyzing the merits of the summary judgment arguments, the
district court noted that, in any dispute involving R.S. 2477 claims, or any
dispute involving claimed federal ownership of any land, the presumption is
“that ownership and management authority lies [sic] with the federal
government and that any adverse claimant, like the County here perhaps, is
not entitled to win title or exercise unilateral management authority until it
successfully has carried its burden of proof in a court of law.”156
The district court then proceeded to analyze the merits of the
Environmental Groups’ Supremacy Clause and preemption claims.157 First,
the court listed the various federal statutory and regulatory authorities
guiding the BLM and NPS’s management actions: the Presidential
Proclamation creating the Monument;158 FLPMA;159 regulations promulgated
pursuant to FLPMA governing management of off-road vehicle use on public
lands;160 the Monument Management Plan, which the BLM adopted through
formal notice and comment rulemaking and which the agency uses as the
primary guideline for managing various public uses in the Monument;161 the
Wilderness Act of 1964162 and the Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, both of
which prohibit the use of permanent and temporary roads within wilderness
areas;163 the National Park Service Organic Act (creating the Park Service and
giving it authority to manage all lands reserved as national parks);164 an
Executive Order (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to develop
administrative rules designating areas for use of off-highway vehicles and
areas where such use is prohibited)165 and regulations promulgated pursuant
to the Executive Order.166 The court then determined that the County’s
ordinance directly conflicted with these federal laws, and held that the
Ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of the Supremacy Clause.167
The court also ordered Kane County to remove the thirty-nine signs
that remained on federal lands managed by NPS and the BLM enjoined
Kane County from “adopt[ing] ordinances, post[ing] signs, or otherwise

156. Id. (citing The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 470 F.Supp. 2d 1300,
1306 (D. Utah 2006)).
157. Id. at 1161.
158. Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 61
Fed. Reg. 50223 (Sept. 18, 1996).
159. 43 U.S.C. § 1732.
160. 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(c) (1980).
161. See 61 Fed. Reg. 50223, 50225.
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1964).
163. Arizona Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-406, 98 Stat. 1485 (1984).
164. 16 U.S.C. § 1-18f-3.
165. Use of Off-Road Vehicles on the Public Lands, Exec. Order No. 11644, 37
Fed. Reg. 2877 (Feb. 8, 1972).
166. 36 C.F.R. § 4.10(a) (1987).
167. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 560 F. Supp.2d 1147, 1163 (D.
Utah 2008) (Kane County I) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990)).
24

West

Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012

purport[ing] to manage or open to vehicle use any route or area closed to
such use by governing federal land management plan or federal law.”168 The
injunction also prohibited Kane County from taking any “other action to
invite or encourage vehicle use on any route or area closed to such use by
governing federal land management plan or federal law” until it proved “in a
court of law” that it possessed valid R.S. 2477 rights in any of the contested
routes.169
In short, before the district court, the Environmental Groups alleged
and pled their case under the Supremacy Clause violation, and they did not
seek, nor did the County request, an adjudication of property rights.170 The
Environmental Groups did not, nor could not, have filed an action to quiet
title in the federal government to the claimed R.S. 2477 routes. However,
based on precedent such as SUWA v. BLM, the Environmental Groups had
standing to bring an action alleging that the County had overstepped its
authority, to put it mildly. The district court reviewed the action as it was
pled, and as noted later by Judge Lucero, in his lengthy dissenting opinion
to the Tenth Circuit’s en banc panel decision “[t]he district court clearly
entered a final judgment without determining the validity of any property
rights.”171

D. The Tenth Circuit’s First Decision: Kane County II
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit phrased the issue before it as whether “a
county [may] exercise management authority over federal lands in a manner
that conflicts with the federal management regime without proving that it
possesses valid R.S. 2477 rights of way.”172 The County’s primary argument
was that the Environmental Groups lacked standing to bring a Supremacy
Clause challenge to their actions.173
To have Article III standing, the Environmental Groups were required
to prove that their members suffered an injury or injuries that were caused
by the County’s actions, which a federal court had jurisdiction to redress.174

168. Id. at 1166.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1149.
171. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1183 (10th Cir. 2011)
(Kane County III) (Lucero, J., dissenting).
172. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Kane County II), rev’d, 632 F.3d 1162.
173. Id. at 1209. The County also argued that the action was mooted by its
repeal of the offending Ordinance, yet the district court and the Tenth Circuit
remained concerned that the County had not demonstrated that it would not reenact
the Ordinance upon the conclusion of the litigation. Moreover, dozens of the County
signs, opening the claimed R.S. 2477 routes to public use, remained in place. Id. at
1215.
174. Id. at 1209-10.
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The majority opinion discussed the Environmental Group’s members’ injury
at length, analyzing them against the United States Supreme Court’s
decisions in Summers v. Earth Island Institute and Sierra Club v. Morton.175 Based
on the standards established in those cases, the majority stated that “[i]n
the environmental context, a plaintiff who has repeatedly visited a particular
site, has imminent plans to do so again, and whose interests are harmed by
a defendant’s conduct has suffered injury in fact.”176 The majority held that
SUWA’s members, who submitted affidavits attesting to their use of the
areas in question for multiple purposes, had demonstrated injury sufficient
for the purposes of Article III standing.177
The heart of the affiants’ claims related to management authority.
Under federal management authority, the alleged R.S. 2477 routes in
question would remain closed, limiting off-road vehicle access to those
Thus, when analyzing causation and
areas the affiants visited.178
redressability, the court focused on the impact of federal versus local
management authority on the Environmental Groups’ members.179 If the
County was allowed to continue its “management” activities, the alleged R.S.
2477 routes would be opened, and off-road vehicle use would be allowed,
and even encouraged.180 As SUWA member Jill Ozarski stated in her
declaration, she “seek[s] out and prefer[s] to use those federal public land[s]
that are more wild; in other words, those lands that are not burdened by
[OHV] use.”181 The County’s signage initiative and Ordinance would,
therefore, cause her to stop recreating in the areas that would be open to
off-road vehicle use.182 The Tenth Circuit held that these assertions satisfied
the latter two elements of the standing test, causation and redressability,
and found that the Environmental Groups had Article III standing to assert
their Supremacy Clause claims in a federal court.183
The County also argued that the Environmental Groups lacked
prudential standing because “(1) they are asserting the legal rights of the
United States; (2) their claims raise generalized grievances; and (3) their
claims fall outside the zone of interest protected by the Supremacy
Clause.”184 The majority quickly disposed of each of these arguments. First,
175. Id. at 1210; 555 U.S. 488, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-50 (2009); 405 U.S. 727,
734-36 (1972).
176. Kane County II, 581 F.3d at 1210.
177. Id. (the affiants declared that they used and enjoyed the resources on
public lands in Kane County for “health, recreational, scientific, spiritual,
educational, aesthetic, and other interests.”).
178. Id. at 1210-11.
179. Id. at 1220-21.
180. Id. at 1210-11.
181. Id. at 1210 (quoting Decl. of Jill N. Ozarski) (alteration in original).
182. Id. at 1211.
183. Id. at 1212-13.
184. Id. at 1216.
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the court noted that the Environmental Groups’ complaint was not stating
an injury to interests of the federal government, but injuries to its members,
who submitted testimony confirming that they used the lands in question
for recreation and other purposes.185 Second, the court held that the
members’ declarations established particular, specific injuries that were not
shared by the general public.186 Finally, with respect to the “zone of interest”
test, the court began its analysis by questioning whether this doctrine even
applies to Supremacy Clause challenges.187 If so, the court reasoned, “The
Supremacy Clause is at least arguably designed to protect individuals
harmed by the application of preempted enactments,” such as the County’s
Ordinance, and the zone of interests test does not require a plaintiff to
definitively prove that his or her interest lies within the “zone” protected by
the legislative act, or, in this case, Constitutional amendment.188
Turning to the merits of the Environmental Groups’ Supremacy Clause
challenge, the court began by stating that the burden of proof, in any case
where a party challenges the federal government’s claim of title, is on the
challenging party.189 This allocation, recognized by the Tenth Circuit in
SUWA v. BLM,190 was not only “consonant with federal law and federal
interests,” as well as state law,191 but it also recognized the long-established
principle that “land ‘grants must be construed favorably to the
government.’”192
As it had before the district court, the County asserted that it had valid
R.S. 2477 rights in the disputed rights, and attempted to use this claim of
title as a defense to the Environmental Groups’ Supremacy Clause
challenge.193 The problem with this argument, as the district court and the
Tenth Circuit recognized, was that the County had not counterclaimed under
the Quiet Title Act, or brought an independent action seeking to quiet
title.194 Thus, the County had never proven that it held title to the alleged
R.S. 2477 routes in a court of law.195
Although, as the Tenth Circuit recognized, in a preemption action, the
185. Id. at 1217.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1220 (citing S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
425 F.3d 735, 768 (10th Cir. 2005) (SUWA v. BLM).
190. 425 F.3d at 768.
191. Id. at 769; see Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d
211, 213 (Utah 1981) (noting that, under Utah law, the party claiming a right-of-way
bears the burden of proving it exists).
192. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 581 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Kane County II), rev’d, 632 F.3d 1162.
193. Id. at 1220-21.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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party asserting that a governmental action is preempted bears the initial
burden of establishing a conflict between federal and local laws.196 Once
that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the defending party to
demonstrate that its actions fall within a “safe harbor” provision of federal
law.197 The court held that the Environmental Groups had met their initial
burden of demonstrating a conflict between the various federal statutes and
regulations governing BLM and the National Park Service’s management of
the federal lands at issue in Kane County, and thus, the burden then shifted
to the County to prove that its actions were authorized by federal law.198
This, the County could not do, because its actions of replacing the federal
road signs with its own signs, adding additional signs, and passing an
Ordinance flouting the federal government’s management authority on
federal public lands, were based on nothing more than an assertion of
property rights. The County had never proven that it held title to the R.S.
2477 routes in question and without doing so, it could not establish a
defense to the preemption claims.199 Also, without proving that it held title
to the routes, the County could not unilaterally exercise management
authority over them.200 The Tenth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district
court’s decision.201
Although this reasoning appears somewhat circular, it makes sense to
create a bright-line rule that states and counties may not take management
actions or engage in construction activities on claimed R.S. 2477 rights-ofway prior to establishing valid title to them in a federal court. Otherwise, if
the past is prologue, local officials will continue to take action contrary to
federal agencies’ management plans, perhaps without consulting the
agencies, and these actions may irreversibly damage fragile ecosystems,
rendering them ineligible for heightened protection as wilderness.

E. The Tenth Circuit’s En Banc Decision: Kane County III
Unsatisfied with the original panel’s decision, the County petitioned
for a rehearing en banc, which the court granted.202 The full panel requested
that the parties brief the issues of whether the Environmental Groups had

196. Id. at 1221 (quoting Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1262
(10th Cir. 2004)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011)
(Kane County III).
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Article III standing or prudential standing; whether the Supremacy Clause203
provides the Environmental Groups with a private right of action; whether
the Counties can assert R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in a way that conflicts with
the federal management plan in the Monument without first filing a Quiet
Title action; whether the Counties could assert R.S. 2477 rights-of-way as a
defense without joining the recognized title-holder (the United States) as a
party to the action; and whether the action was moot due to Kane County’s
decision to remove its road signs and rescind its Ordinance.204
Disappointingly, the court stopped after the first issue and did not
address any of the others. With respect to the prudential standing doctrine,
the majority aptly noted that “the question of prudential standing is often
resolved by the nature and source of the claim.”205 Then, the majority stated
that the Environmental Groups “rest [their] claims on the federal
government’s property rights,”206 essentially recasting this litigation as a
property dispute between two landowners, rather than a constitutional
challenge brought by interested citizens seeking to challenge a local
government’s attempts to undermine the federal government’s
implementation of its laws and regulations. By twisting the Environmental
Groups’ claims into property rights, the majority was able to arrive at the
conclusion that they lacked standing to assert the property rights of the
federal government, under the prudential standing doctrine.207
Prudential standing, as the en banc majority noted, “embodies
‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’”208 It
also prohibits a litigant from “raising another person’s legal rights.”209 Yet,
the determination of whether, in fact, a litigant is attempting to assert the
claims of another depends entirely how “the claim” or “the right” is
defined.210 If the Environmental Groups’ claim was that the County was
trespassing, for example, prudential standing would bar them from asserting
it because the federal government would be the proper plaintiff. If the
Environmental Groups brought the claim based on their members’ use of
the federal lands, and the impact that the County’s actions had on that use,
as was the case here, then the Environmental Groups would, in fact, be the
only parties that could bring those claims.

203. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that federal law is “the Supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
204. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1183 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 1169.
206. Id. at 1170.
207. Id. at 1187 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1168 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11
(2010)).
209. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (2009).
210. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1169.
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Concluding that the Environmental Groups rested their claim “on the
federal government’s property rights,” the en banc panel stated that they
“obviously” sought to enforce the federal government’s property rights
because their “claims turn on the superiority of the federal government’s
property claim.”211 Thus, the en banc panel vacated the district court’s
decision and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss it.212
The dissent, written by the same judge who had authored the majority
panel decision two years earlier, forcefully criticized the en banc majority’s
about-face on R.S. 2477 and its recasting of the Environmental Groups’
claims.213 As noted by the dissent, the en banc majority’s decision reversed
the burden of proof formerly established by the Tenth Circuit in R.S. 2477
cases and Supremacy Clause challenges.214 Rather than requiring the County
to prove that it held R.S. 2477 rights in the alleged roads, the decision
assumed that to be true and required the Environmental Groups to
overcome that presumption. The majority’s decision also completely
ignored the merits of the five issues that the court had asked the parties to
brief, despite the Supreme Court’s strong preference for deciding cases on
the merits and despite the obvious need for guidance on R.S. 2477 issues for
litigants.
Moreover, the County did not counterclaim under the Quiet Title Act,
which is the “exclusive means” by which the United States’ title to federal
lands may be challenged.215 According to the Supreme Court, “[o]nce the
‘United States claims an interest’ in land, there is one way — and only one
way — to disturb federal possession: by bringing a QTA suit.”216 Otherwise,
litigants can “easily avoid Congress’ ‘carefully crafted provisions of the QTA
deemed necessary for the protection of the national public interest.’”217
Furthermore, the dissent noted that “Despite the majority’s aspirations to
the contrary, there is no R.S. 2477 exception to the Block rule, as the Seventh
and District of Columbia Circuits have recognized.”218 The Kane County

211. Id. at 1171.
212. Id. at 1170, 1174.
213. Id. at 1181 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 1190.
215. Id. at 1186 (quoting Block v. N. Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands,
461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983)).
216. Id. at 1184-85 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting Block, 461 U.S. at 286).
217. Id. at 1185 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting Block, 461 U.S. at 284) (citing
Sw. Four Wheel Drive Ass’n v. Bureau Land Mgmt., 363 F.3d 1069, 1071 (10th Cir.
2004); Sw. Four Wheel Drive Ass’n v. Bureau Land Mgmt., 271 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1310
(D.N.M. 2003)).
218. Id. (citing Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,222 F.3d 383,
385-86 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that “because the plaintiffs did not bring their claim
under the QTA,” the court “ could not consider the issue of title to the land.”).
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decision thus created a circuit split,219 in addition to setting the precedent
that a county can now “seek a legal determination of disputed title without
being subject to the [QTA] limitations placed on such challenges.”220

V. Gaps in the Tenth Circuit’s R.S. 2477 Jurisprudence After
Kane County III
As the dissenting opinion accurately noted, Kane County III “is a pivotal
case which, unless reversed or modified, will have long-term deleterious
effects on the use and management of federal public lands.”221 This is true
for three primary reasons. First, the Tenth Circuit’s en banc holding fails to
recognize the complexity of the legal landscape involved in an R.S. 2477
adjudication. These are not mere property disputes between adjoining
landowners in an urban subdivision, subject only to common law doctrines
of trespass and easements. Instead, these disputes often invoke upwards of
three federal statutes, federal regulations, land management plans, state
common law, and they involve not only the “landowners,” but parties that
have deep-rooted, personal interests in how the contested land is managed.
Second, the Tenth Circuit’s en banc decision to invoke the easily
manipulated doctrine of prudential standing to dismiss the litigants, rather
than creating a legal framework for resolving future disputes ignores strong
Supreme Court precedent for deciding cases on their merits. Moreover, the
Tenth Circuit’s unwillingness to create a consistent body of jurisprudence
surrounding the issue of RS 2477 claims in Hodel, SUWA v. BLM, and
especially, in Kane County III, has muddied an already very murky body of
law.222 Kane County III represented an opportunity to establish a framework
within which to resolve R.S. 2477 disputes, streamlining negotiations
between the parties and easing the burden on federal district courts that

219. See Montanans for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 228-29 (D.C.
App. 2009); Shawnee Trail, 222 F.3d at 386-88.
220. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1186 (quoting Shawnee Trail, 222 F.3d at 388); see
also Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that parties asserting R.S. 2477
claims must proceed under the Quiet Title Act).
221. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1180 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
222. In a concurring opinion, three of the members of the en banc panel posed
as open questions at least two issues related to R.S. 2477 claims that the court had
previously addressed and resolved in prior decisions. See e.g. Kane County III, 632 F.3d
at 1178 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that all of the questions were “intriguing”
but declining to posit any answers to them). For example, they asked: “Does an R.S.
2477 right of way holder have to prove its existing rights before exercising those
rights in a federally regulated monument or park?” Id. This question was squarely
addressed and answered in the affirmative by the decision in S. Utah Wilderness Alliance
v. Bureau of Lang Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 768-69 (10th Cir. 2005) (SUWA v. BLM) (holding
that those seeking to establish R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in a national monument bear
the burden of proof of the claim).
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must adjudicate these complex claims. Several questions that the court
could have answered in the process were (1) the proper allocation of
burdens of proof in R.S. 2477 actions, (2) whether a party seeking to assert
an R.S. 2477 claim must bring a quiet title claim in federal court if the
federal government contests title, (3) whether there is any presumption that
the federal government has title, and therefore, management authority, over
all as-yet unclaimed R.S. 2477 routes, and (4) if so, whether such a
presumption may be rebutted. Instead, the court did not, and “the resulting
anarchy and chaos in the national parks, national monuments, and federal
public lands lying within this circuit is profound.”223
Moreover, despite the majority’s reluctance to address the merits of
the R.S. 2477 debate in Kane County, appellate courts have a responsibility to
consider how lower courts and administrative bodies—to the extent they
rely on federal appellate decisions as persuasive authority—will interpret
their holdings. Appellate courts, for better or worse, guide lower courts in
their application of legal principles to future cases or controversies and they
do these lower courts a disservice by circumventing the merits of a
contentious issue like R.S. 2477 in favor of dismissing the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has strongly
discouraged federal appellate courts from this course of action for precisely
the reasons that the Kane County decision illustrate: (1) dismissing a case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, while not technically resolving a dispute
“on the merits,” has the effect of deciding the case on the merits because, as
in this instance, Kane County can now proceed with its attempts to open
rights-of-way over which the federal government claims title because the
sole party in the best position to litigate the federal government’s position
has now been thrown out of court224 and (2) the lack of a thorough roadmap
as to how to resolve future RS 2477 claims will mean that, in the inevitable
tide of R.S. 2477 litigation to come, lower courts will issue inconsistent
decisions and parties will have no guidelines on how to establish, assert, or
challenge R.S. 2477 rights.
Third, the Tenth Circuit’s Kane County decision represents yet another
opportunity to clarify the burdens of proof and production in R.S. 2477
disputes, yet the court sidestepped the merits altogether and dismissed the
appeal because it held that the environmental plaintiffs did not have
prudential standing. By turning a blind eye to the County’s trespassory
actions and allowing it to proceed as if an R.S. 2477 right of way existed
absent a quiet title action, the court has created a paradigm under which
counties may possibly divest the federal government of property rights

223. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1181 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
224. Id. (Lucero, J., dissenting) (noting that “Tomorrow, Kane County can
proceed with its signage program.”).
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without bringing an action under the Quiet Title Act,225 so long as the federal
government is not joined as a party to the litigation. The Tenth Circuit has
also created a circuit split on the appropriate presumptions in an R.S. 2477
case.226
Consistency requires adherence to the generally accepted principle
that the Quiet Title Act is “the exclusive means by which adverse claimants
[may] challenge the United States’ title to real property.”227 If an exception is
required for R.S. 2477 claims by virtue of the uniquenature of these property
rights and how they arise, the court should adhere to the foundational
holdings it has thus far established. Either way, it should provide definitive
guidance to litigants and interested parties alike in each of the abovementioned areas.

VI. Conclusion
As federal agencies regulate the vast areas of public lands under
federal ownership more closely, restricting access to a smaller number of
roads and trails to minimize the human footprint, further clashes between
local and state governments and federal agencies will undoubtedly continue
to arise. When the next R.S. 2477 case reaches the Tenth Circuit, the court
should address the issues raised above – the burdens of proof, the nature of
an R.S. 2477 claim or defense, and how R.S. 2477 factors into agency
management decisions under statutes like FLPMA – and address challenges
on the merits of the parties’ pleadings. This way, at the very least, litigants
and lower courts could proceed to adjudicate the respective property rights
accordingly.
Moreover, the Kane County decision has created a circuit split on the
issue of whether an R.S. 2477 claimant is required to bring an action under
the Quiet Title Act before actively claiming title to a right-of-way that is
disputed by the federal government.228 In its next R.S. 2477 case, the court
should force states and counties to file a quiet title suit or participate in the
relevant agency planning process if either of those two methods fail. Absent
either of these two choices, states and counties should not be able to rely
on, or otherwise, assert R.S. 2477 rights in a court of law.
Finally, because the Tenth Circuit has not established clear guidelines

225. Id. at 1195.
226. Id.; Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,222 F.3d 383, 385-86
(7th Cir.2000).
227. Block v. N. Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286
(1983).
228. Kane County III, 632 F.3d at 1181 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (citing Montanans
for Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 568 F.3d 225, 228-29 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that an
R.S. 2477 claim “must proceed under the Quiet Title Act.”); Shawnee Trail
Conservancy v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 222 F.3d 383, 386-88 (7th Cir. 2000).
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on how agencies should consider R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in their planning
processes, there is confusion within the district courts about the extent to
which district courts may consider evidence of R.S. 2477 claims in actions
challenging agency planning processes or other decisions, and to what
extent the agency may act or decline to act based on these claims.229
Agencies, as well as the public, must have some guidance from the court
about how R.S. 2477 claims play a role in the agency land management
planning process. As of yet, this has proven thorny for lower courts to
navigate230 and Kane County III does nothing to facilitate that process.
In short, the Tenth Circuit has its work cut out for it when the next R.S.
2477 case reaches it. Given that “there are thousands of miles of claimed
R.S. 2477 rights of way across federal lands in the western United States,”231
this issue will likely come before the court many times in the near future.
R.S. 2477 will also continue to cause litigation across the western half of the
country, where unclaimed R.S. 2477 routes no doubt traverse many of our
nation’s national parks, BLM lands, Wilderness Study Areas, National
Monuments, and other reserves.232 As long ago as 1993, “the National Park
Service estimated that 68 of the 376 park units nationwide, encompassing 17
million acres, could be affected by R.S. 2477.”233 If left to their own devices,
states and counties will continue to grade and improve these “roads,” which
will “undoubtedly derogate most [park] unit values and seriously impact the
ability of NPS to manage the units for the purposes for which they were
established.”234
Instead of clarifying an already murky body of law, the Kane County III
decision adds further confusion within the circuit and amongst the
neighboring circuits containing R.S. 2477-eligible lands. The resulting
burden on federal district courts is tremendous because they must continue
to adjudicate disputed R.S. 2477 rights-of-way in a relative jurisprudential

229. E.g. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp.2d 1178,
1198 (D. Utah 2005) (SUWA v. Nat’l Park Serv.).
230. SUWA v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp.2d at 1198.
231. The Wilderness Soc’y v. Kane Cnty., Utah, 581 F.3d 1198, 1205 (10th Cir.
2009) (Kane County II).
232. Probasco, Christian, County in Utah Wins Title to R.S. 2477 Roads, NEW WEST
COMMUNITY BLOG (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.newwest.net/topic/article/county_in_
utah_wins_title_to_rs_2477_roads/C566/L564/; See, e.g., United States v. Nye County,
920 F. Supp. 1108, 1109-10, 1111 (D. Nev. 1996) (regarding Nye County
Commissioner’s bulldozing a road into Toiyabe National Forest); Mike Gorrell, Feds
Sue to Halt Road Work in Wild Utah Areas Feds Sue to Halt County Road Graders, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Oct. 19, 1996, at A1; Vincent J. Schodolski, Range Wars: Nevada Struggle Emblematic
of Battle to Put Public Land Strictly in Counties’ Hands, S.F. EXAM’R, May 21, 1995, at A6; Ed
Vogel, Nye’s Carver Leads Fight for Land Use, LAS VEGAS REV. J., May 7, 1995, at 1.A; Jim
Woolf, Road-Grading Dispute Reaches Uintah County, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 2, 1999, at C3.
233. Wilkinson, supra note 4, at 23.
234. Id.
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vacuum, navigating the statutes, regulations, and Tenth Circuit precedent
with no clear framework from the Tenth Circuit. It is hard to imagine an
appellate court side-stepping the merits of this issue if the battle were
taking place on Liberty Island National Monument, but hopefully the Tenth
Circuit will see the need to provide some guidance before the nation loses
some equally valuable and historic places.
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